

































Abstract:  The  article  reviews  Constitutionalizing  Economic  Globalization  by  David 
Schneiderman.  In  the  book,  Schneiderman  examines  the  relationships  between  international 
investment  rules  and  constitutional  principles  of  liberal  democracy  and  identifies  how 
arbitrators have  interpreted  investment  treaties  in ways  that  take constitutionalist notions of 
limited government beyond their domestic trajectories and that promote versions of the ‘rule 
of law’ with a distinctly neo‐liberal bent. Ironically, this portrayal of investment arbitration as an 
institutional  hammer  of  neo‐liberalism  that  is  just  now  hitting  its  nails  coincides  with  a 
resurgent Keynesianism and renewed regulation at the domestic level, making the investment‐




liberal  constitutional  structure  including  institutional  safeguards  of  judicial  independence. 
Nevertheless, Schneiderman offers powerful insights on the capacity for alternative visions and 
resistance.  It  is  also  refreshing,  in  an  age  of  too  much  talk  about  globalization,  to  see 
Schneiderman  focus  on  national  governments  and  their  power  to  undo  that which  has  been 
done. 
 

















The  rules  regime  established  by  investment  treaties  is  complex  and  opaque.  Yet  it  has 
generated controversy across countries and continents. People have protested and sometimes 
died,  not  only  to  resist  harm  they  foresee  to  their  lives  and  communities  from  foreign 
investment  but  also  to  respond  to  the  arcane  processes  of  investment  treaties  themselves. 
Many local organizations have focused their sights on investment arbitration because of its role 
as  a  key  forum  in  which  decisions  of  great  importance  to  their  constituencies  are  made. 
Arbitration has  supplanted other decision makers  in matters of high public policy and has,  in 
turn,  found  itself  mired  in  the  politics  of  conflicts  involving  communities,  governments,  and 
international business. The politics of this environment for decision making, in turn, appear to 
be  deeply  mistrusted,  even  derided,  by  many  arbitrators  and  advocates  of  investment 
arbitration. 
 
David  Schneiderman’s  Constitutionalizing  Economic  Globalization  draws  on  constitutional 
theory  to  survey  this  field  of  controversy.  Schneiderman’s  orientation  emphasizes  both  the 
political  importance and the practical benefits of democratic pluralism. The book  is  rich  in  its 
study  of  the  relationships  between  international  investment  rules  and  the  constitutional 
principles of liberal democracy. A central theme is that those who manage the investment‐rules 
system,  especially  the  arbitrators  and  their  surrounding  ‘band  of  elites’  (160),  have  taken 
investment treaties well beyond conventional notions of limited government in the interests of 
a rather stark, neo‐liberal vision of society and markets. Schneiderman explores how the neo‐
liberal  program,  in  turn,  has  re‐entered  the  domestic  sphere  through  the  real  or  imagined 
power  of  investment  law.  Although  the  impact  of  this  re‐entry may  not  be  determinative  of 
policy decisions in the wider context of domestic politics, Schneiderman argues that investment 
treaties  have,  nonetheless,  removed  important  options  for  pluralist  self‐government.  He 
expresses  a  highly  aspirational  yet  constructive  aim:  ‘Rather  than  instituting  a  transnational 




The  potency  of  the  investment‐rules  regime  compared  to  other  international  adjudicative 
systems  stems  from  the  ability  of  investors  (usually  transnational  firms)  to  sue  governments 
and  from the corresponding power of arbitrators  to award  investors public compensation  for 
the  negative  consequences  of  regulatory  activity.  Investor  claims  are  decided  by  tripartite 




arbitration  tribunals,  one  member  of  which  is  appointed  by  the  investor,  another  by  the 
respondent state, and the third, a presiding arbitrator, by agreement of the parties (or party‐
appointed arbitrators) or by a default appointing authority such as the president of the World 





damages  to  the  investor.  The award can  then be enforced against  the  state’s assets  in other 










arbitration  as  a  system  of  adjudication  but  rather  on  the  rules  regime  as  a  system  of 
government  and,  in  particular,  on  its  suppression  of  previously  available  avenues  for 
democratic choice and regulatory adaptation. 
 
Schneiderman  begins  by  examining  the  legal  and  ideological  underpinnings  of  international 
investment  rules.  He  studies  how  key  concepts  under  the  treaties,  especially  the  concept  of 
expropriation,  originate  in  domestic  constitutions,  especially  that  of  the  United  States.  In 
elaborating on this, Schneiderman provides an excellent survey in chapter 2 of US case law on 
the  Fifth  Amendment  safeguards  against  takings  of  property.  For  instance,  he  connects 
expansive  readings  of  ‘indirect  expropriation’  by  investment  tribunals  to  US  Supreme  Court 
Justice  Scalia’s  move  toward  the  ‘sole  effect’  doctrine  in  US  takings  law  and  away  from  the 
predominant  alternative  ‘that  considers  public  interest  objectives  under  the  rubric  of 





investment awards  focuses on  those  involving  the  three NAFTA states and, more broadly, on 
the  implications  of NAFTA  for Mexico  and  Canada. On  the  other  hand,  Schneiderman  shows 
how  other  constitutions  –  such  as  those  of  Dicey’s  Great  Britain,  Weimar  Germany,  and 
twentieth‐century  Latin  American  states  –  adopted  different  orientations  to  property  rights, 
inspired, for instance, by Léon Duguit’s view of the state and property as institutions justified by 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the  social  function  they  perform  (cited  at  165).  Schneiderman  also  makes  clear  that  the 








public  initiatives may contravene the  investment rules. On the  first, Schneiderman recalls  the 





sub‐national  governments  in  order  to  determine  whether  there  has  been  regulatory  chill  in 
certain branches of government’ (70). Although Schneiderman does not aspire to this  level of 
empirical scrutiny, he establishes a powerful preliminary case in his discussion of the impact of 
NAFTA  threats or  claims on Canadian efforts  to  require plain packaging of  cigarettes  (120–9) 
and to ban a gasoline additive on precautionary grounds (129–34), both for well‐founded public 






tribunals  opted  for  highly  expansive  approaches  to  various  disciplines.  His  condemnation  of 
Metalclad1 is powerful, focusing on the tribunal’s failure even to mention local concerns about 
dumping  of  hazardous  waste  in  the  relevant  region  of  Mexico  and  its  further  strategy  of 
interpreting  away  the  authority  of  Mexican  municipalities  to  refuse  building  permits  for 
environmental  reasons  (82–6).  Metalclad,  and  other  early  NAFTA  awards,  are  critiqued 
extensively to demonstrate how tribunals have actively exacerbated concerns about regulatory 
chill while also exciting prospective future claimants and their counsel. That said, Schneiderman 
does  not  go  further  and  examine  the  later  wave  of  NAFTA  cases,  including,  for  instance, 
Loewen,2 ADF,3 and Methanex,4  that adopt a moderated position  in  the balancing of  investor 
interests  against  regulatory  concerns.  He  also  does  not  address  the  apparent  irony  that  the 
numerous awards that have dismissed claims against the United States have tended to adopt 
                                                1  Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States (Merits) (30 August 2000), 16 I.C.S.I.D. Rev. 168, 40 I.L.M. 36, 5 I.C.S.I.D. Rep. 212, (2001) 13:1 World Trade and Arb. Mat. 45. 2  Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America (Merits) (26 June 2003), 42 I.L.M. 811, 7 I.C.S.I.D. Rep. 442, (2003) 15:5 World Trade and Arb. Mat. 97. 3  ADF Group Inc. v. United States of America (Merits) (9 January 2003), 18 I.C.S.I.D. Rev. 195, 6 I.C.S.I.D. Rep. 470, (2003) 15:3 World Trade and Arb. Mat. 55. 4  Methanex Corporation v. United States of America (Merits) (3 August 2005), 44 I.L.M. 1345, (2005) 17:6 World Trade and Arb. Mat. 61. 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Colombia  for  the  most  part,  in  order  to  examine  conflicts  between  investment  rules  and 
domestic policy choices involving land reform or social redistribution. In chapter 5, he provides 
an outstanding review of the political history of black economic empowerment (BEE) legislation 
in  South  Africa  and  its  consequent  triggering  of  an  investor  claim  against  South  Africa. 
Schneiderman  reviews  how  the  legislation  was  originally  approached  by  the  South  African 
government with  great  caution  and  concludes  that  ‘broad‐based  BEE,  in  sum,  is  designed  to 
offend, as little as possible, foreign investors and the legal regime for their protection. It is, for 
the  most  part,  a  measured  and  modest  attempt  at  reversing  the  apartheid‐era  project  of 
economic inequality’ (154). Even so, two Italian companies brought a treaty claim against South 
Africa  to  resist  one  of  the  few  remaining  teeth  in  the  legislation,  its  requirements  for 
divestment in the mining sector. Schneiderman examines this claim by a careful assessment of 
how the language of the BEE legislation appears to violate investment treaties, especially their 
prohibitions  on  discrimination  against  foreign  investors.  It  is  a  troubling  account  of  the 
apparent  collision  between  investor  interests  and  social  reform  in  circumstances  where  the 
redress of  past  injustice does not occur by  great  leaps  forward but  rather  in baby  steps.  For 
Schneiderman, the case study reveals how ‘South Africa’s internal policy options will have been 
shaped by the external environment for the promotion and protection of  foreign  investment’ 
(157).  As  to  what  this  says  about  the  pre‐eminence  of  investor  interests,  Schneiderman 
concludes glumly that ‘state projects, like broad‐based BEE, likely will serve as weak vehicles for 
economic redistribution in a country rife with inequality, while narrowing the available range of 
preferred  policy  options’  (157).  Broadly,  alongside  his  other  case  studies  on  land  reform  in 
South  African  and  constitutional  reform  in  Colombia,  Schneiderman’s  research  reveals  how 
arbitrators are called on to make governing choices in an adjudicative context. 
 
Throughout  many  of  its  chapters,  the  book  identifies  how  arbitrators  have  interpreted 
investment  treaties  in ways  that  take constitutionalist notions of  limited government beyond 




even  beyond  its  conventional  limits,  centered  around  land,  to  the  protection  of  wealth  and 
future profits uncoupled from specific property rights’ (53). The predominant ideology at work 








needless  to  say  –  that win  favour  in  investment‐law  circles  have  a  distinctly  neo‐liberal  bent 
(53).  Indeed,  the  investment‐rules  regime  emerges  for  Schneiderman  as  an  ‘institutional 
partner’ of neo‐liberalism (2). 
 
Schneiderman  references,  for  example,  the Oscar  Chinn  decision  of  the  Permanent  Court  of 
International  Justice  (73).  In  1931,  Belgium  established  a  de  facto  monopoly  in  the  Belgian 
Congo  for  its  state‐owned  river  transport  company  in  order  to  allow  it  to  survive  a  severe 
commercial depression. A competing private company, owned by British national Oscar Chinn, 






his discriminatory and  inequitable treatment, at  the hands of  the Belgian colonial authorities. 
Most  arbitrators would  quickly  reject  as  self‐serving  any  response  by  Belgium  (or  Argentina) 
that the foreign investor’s position was characterized by the possession of customers and the 
possibility  of  making  a  profit  …  Favourable  business  conditions  and  goodwill  are  transient 
circumstances,  subject  to  inevitable  changes  …  no  enterprise  –  least  of  all  a  commercial  or 





decision  disposing  of  Chinn’s  claim  in  1934.  Clearly,  the  PCIJ  adopted  a  flexible  approach  to 
state  regulation  in  the  face  of  economic  uncertainty,  one  that  contrasts  abjectly with  recent 
awards against Argentina (99–101). As Schneiderman argues, there has been a ‘decided tilt’ in 
the  interpretation  of  international  law  to  favour  foreign  investors,  courtesy  of  investment 




















whether arbitrators  still  have  the  temerity  to  sacrifice  regulatory  concerns  in  the  interests of 
compensation  for  foreign  investors.  On  the  other  hand,  recent  harrowing  events  in 
international finance have also revealed that by far the greatest threats to social welfare from 
neo‐liberal  ideology – through  its unbridling of self‐serving behaviour  in markets – stem from 
decisions of domestic  governments, not  those of  international  adjudicators. What  stands out 
today  is  not  regulatory  chill  created by  investment  treaties  but  the  sheer  anachronism of  an 
arbitration system built as  the  institutional hammer of neo‐liberalism and  just now hitting  its 
nails at a time of resurgent Keynesianism and renewed regulation. Events since the publication 
of Schneiderman’s work have reaffirmed that corporate investment and international financial 
flows  rest  on  foundations  of  state  support.  What  else  can  one  take  from  recent  default 
nationalizations of the private sector and socialization of the cost of market risks gone wrong? 
As  Schneiderman  foreshadows,  state  capitalism  has  returned  with  a  vengeance  to  rescue 
national economies from failed experiments in financial deregulation. Schneiderman describes 
constitutional models  of  ‘countries  from  the  South’  as  envisaging  ‘a  regime  of  constitutional 
rules and structures that facilitate the exercise of government power through state building and 
national enterprise’  (158, 223–4). But  the description might be applied equally  to  the US and 
British  constitutions,  given  their  evident  flexibility  to  allow  the  effective  expropriation  of 
(bankrupt)  assets  of major  banks  and  firms  so  as  to manage  their  restructuring  and  protect 
against  repossession  by  foreign  creditors.  These  events  make  the  investment‐rules  regime’s 
claims to detachment from politics and government look all the more disingenuous or naïve. 
 
A  major  strength  of  Schneiderman’s  work  is  its  examination  of  the  rules  regime  in  light  of 




that  are  difficult  to  alter  (4,  180).  The  system  ‘resembles  the  structure’  of  a  domestic  bill  of 
rights;  it  ‘replicates  patterns’  of  US  constitutional  protections  (223).  More  strongly, 
Schneiderman  claims  that  the  regime  ‘can  be  understood  as  an  emerging  form  of 
supraconstitution  that  can  supersede  domestic  constitutional  norms’  (3).  Even  in  its  more 
modest version, however, Schneiderman’s case for ‘constitutionalization’ is open to doubt. 
 
In  the  first  place,  Schneiderman  does  not  elaborate  what  it  means  for  a  treaty  system  to 
resemble  a  constitutional  structure  or  replicate  constitutional  patterns.  All  treaties  put 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constraints of varying sorts on states. Do they all resemble or replicate domestic constitutions? 
Or  does  resemblance  come  about  only  when  the  treaty  regime  obtains  a  particular  level  or 
form of obligation or enforcement? What is the threshold for resemblance, as opposed to mere 
likeness,  between  a  treaty  system  of  international  review  and  a  constitutional  structure? 
Should an assessment of whether  the  line  is crossed  focus on  the breadth or  intensity of  the 
legal  disciplines,  or  on  the  duration of  a  state’s  obligations,  or  on  the  use  of  adjudication  to 
review conduct  and enforce obligations? The adjudicative  structure of  investment  treaties  is, 
indeed,  exceptional  from an  international  perspective,  just  as  its  reliance on  state  liability  to 
discipline  legislative  activity  is  extraordinary  from  a  domestic  viewpoint.  But  this  says  more 
about  the  form  of  constitutionalism  that  is  advanced  than  about  a  distinction  between 
constitutional  and  non‐constitutional  constraint.  One  could  respond  that  the  system’s 
constitutional  significance  lies  rather  in  its  implications  –  given,  especially,  the  examples  of 
regulatory chill and policy conflict that Schneiderman documents – but here again, it is difficult 
to  see  how  investment  treaties  have  impacts  beyond  those  of  other  international  regimes. 





The  invocation of  national  constitutions  to  frame  the  investment‐rules  regime  risks  elevating 
investment  treaties  beyond  their  actual  significance.  Both  politically  and  economically,  the 




cannot  do  is  prevent  the  arbitrators  from  convening  themselves  as  tribunals  or  stop  other 
states from recognizing and enforcing the awards. But even so, states can respond by removing 
their  assets  from  arbitration‐friendly  jurisdictions  while  questioning  the  system’s  legitimacy 
overall.  In  short,  they  can  approach  the  regime  simply  as  one  institutional  feature  of 
international politics, no more entitled to legitimacy than any other such feature, whether the 
United  Nations  Security  Council,  the  International  Monetary  Fund,  or  the  World  Trade 
Organization.  A  core  weakness  of  the  constitutionalization  rubric,  used  in  many  settings  of 
international economic law, is its ignoring of the role of constituent authority in the formation 
of constitutions. The  label  is applied  to  international decision‐making processes, usually  in an 
effort  to  piggyback  on  the  legitimacy  of  domestic  courts  and  constitutions,  although  these 
international processes are ‘constitutional’ only in the very mechanical sense of an adjudicative 
process  followed by  final  decision.  Schneiderman  comments  that  ‘we  should  not  understand 
the  rules  and  structures  of  economic  globalization  as  the  project  of  some  immanent  and 




The  claim  that  a  regime  is  constitutionalized  also  seems  misplaced  where  the  adjudicative 
arrangement  itself  lacks  integral  components  of  a  liberal  constitutional  structure,  including 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institutional  safeguards  of  judicial  independence  and  ongoing  opportunities  for  judicial–
legislative interaction. Investment arbitration does not even satisfy the modest institutionalized 
safeguards  for  judicial  independence  that  are  adopted  at  international  courts.  It  is  more 
appropriately regarded as an adjudicative arm of international executive agencies at the World 
Bank,  the  Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration,  and  private  arbitration  centres  or  chambers  of 
commerce.  Thus,  even  if we  limit  our understanding of  constitutionalism  to  its  juridified  and 
court‐centred  manifestations,  as  elaborated,  for  example,  by  Alexander  Hamilton  in  the 
Federalist  Papers  (cited  at  10),  the  investment‐rules  regime  departs  fundamentally  from  the 
constitutionalist models of Western liberal democracy. 
 






monopoly over  the use of  law and  adjudication  to  enable markets  or  restrain  states  (or  vice 
versa).  Schneiderman  suggests  as  much  in  chapter  8  through  his  discussion  of  the  enabling 
notion of the ‘social rule of law’ (207), although he downplays the viability of rule of law–based 
conceptual alternatives. More important, however, is the point that the regime appears not to 






and  predictability  for  investors,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  wider  themes  of  dislocation  and 
insecurity  that  are  associated  with  globalization  for  other  actors  (185).  This  leads  to 
Schneiderman’s diagnosis that the system is based on ‘a version of citizenship with identifiable 
rights and membership in a particular and privileged community’ (187) and on a mythology of 
the  global  entrepreneur  as  the  pre‐eminent  world  citizen  (188–9).  His  alternative  to  this 
privileging  of  investors  is  to  reinvigorate  an  enabling  vision  of  constitutionalism  in  which 




self‐protection,’  he  argues,  ‘that  is  under  threat  by  the  constitution‐like  features  of  the 
investment‐rules  regime’  (186);  indeed,  its  removal  ‘may be  catastrophic  for many people  in 
the world’ (225). Schneiderman recalls the commonwealth period of US constitutionalism prior 
to the Civil War, in which ‘it was considered a reasonable‐investment backed expectation that 
property  rights  would  be  limited  by  the  state  or  its  delegates  in  the  interests  of  national 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development’ (225–6). Property ‘was valued for its “dynamic” rather than its “static” features: 

















between  the  economy  and democracy’  (235).  This  is  a  powerful  answer  in  a  time of  climate 







transnational  actors  and  nonetheless  bound  by  the  very  same  investment  disciplines  (195). 
More  important  is  their  role  as  ‘discursive  sites  with  which  to  explore  political  alternatives’ 
(196).  Schneiderman  also  cautions  against  grand  but  unproven  aspirations  for  transnational 




that  which  is  being  done’  (204)  and  they  should  pull  back  from  ‘binding  pre‐commitment 
strategies’  that  ‘seem out of proportion …  to  the actual objectives of  securing  increased FDI’ 
(225). This is a realistic assessment, not just of the system, but of its apparently constitutional 
features. One who opposes this novel adjudicative regime in favour of established frameworks 
for  democratic  choice  and  regulatory  innovation  should  work  towards  getting  responsible 
government officials to amend or annul the treaties (or contracts) or to conclude new treaties 
that  establish  a more  acceptable  arrangement  for  review.  This  is may  be  a  somewhat  banal 
conclusion for a discussion about the constitutionalization of economic globalization, but it is a 
very sensible one. 
